Managing Competition on a Two‐Sided Platform

18 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2019

See all articles by Paul Belleflamme

Paul Belleflamme

CORE and Louvain School of Management, UCL (Université Catholique de Louvain); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: Spring 2019

Abstract

On many two‐sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.

Keywords: Imperfect competition, intermediation, network effects, platform competition, pricing, two‐sided markets

Suggested Citation

Belleflamme, Paul and Peitz, Martin, Managing Competition on a Two‐Sided Platform (Spring 2019). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 28, Issue 1, pp. 5-22, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3320054 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12311

Paul Belleflamme (Contact Author)

CORE and Louvain School of Management, UCL (Université Catholique de Louvain) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
POBox L1.03.01
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, B-1348
Belgium
+32 10 47 82 91 (Phone)
+32 10 47 43 01 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://perso.uclouvain.be/paul.belleflamme/Site/Home.html

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 621 181-1835 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://peitz.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
119
PlumX Metrics