Bias-Corrected Estimation of Price Impact in Securities Litigation

American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming 2019.

25 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2019 Last revised: 8 May 2019

See all articles by Taylor Dove

Taylor Dove

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Davidson Heath

University of Utah David Eccles School of Business

J.B. Heaton

J.B. Heaton, P.C.

Date Written: March 24, 2019

Abstract

The single-firm event studies that securities litigants use to detect the impact of a corrective disclosure on a firm’s stock price have low statistical power. As a result, observed price impacts are biased against defendants and systematically overestimate the effect on firm value. We use the empirical distribution of daily stock returns to analyze the bias and develop bias-corrected estimators of price impact in securities litigation. Because of low statistical power, the ex ante incentives against committing securities fraud are also too low. We analyze the adjustment for optimal deterrence and find that it is material, but is nowhere equal to the opposing truncation bias.

Keywords: Event Studies, Securities Litigation, Bias Correction, Price Impact, Compensatory Damages, Punitive Damages

JEL Classification: G14, K13, K22

Suggested Citation

Dove, Taylor and Heath, Davidson and Heaton, J.B., Bias-Corrected Estimation of Price Impact in Securities Litigation (March 24, 2019). American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming 2019.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321180 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3321180

Taylor Dove

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9303
United States

Davidson Heath

University of Utah David Eccles School of Business ( email )

Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

J.B. Heaton (Contact Author)

J.B. Heaton, P.C. ( email )

Chicago, IL
United States
(312) 487-2600 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://jbheaton.com

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