Originalism and Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning in Chisholm v. Georgia

56 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2019

Date Written: January 24, 2019

Abstract

This Article presents a new perspective on the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence during the Early Republic. It focuses on what I am calling second-order ipse dixit reasoning, which occurs when Justices have to decide between two incommensurable interpretive modalities. If first-order ipse dixit is unreasoned decision-making, second-order ipse dixit involves an unreasoned choice between or among two or more equally valid interpretive options. The early Court often had recourse to second-order ipse dixit because methodological eclecticism characterized its constitutional jurisprudence, and the early Court established no fixed hierarchy among interpretive modalities.

Chisholm, the pre-Marshall Court’s most important constitutional decision, illustrates second-order ipse dixit reasoning. The Justices issued their opinions seriatim, and they did not engage with one another’s reasoning. As a result, the Court issues a ruling, but there is no agreement as to the basis for that ruling. Rather, the Justices present us with five separate legal essays in which they ruminate on the nature of sovereignty and its relationship to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

Scholarly engagement with the constitutional jurisprudence of the early Court has gained new urgency because originalist scholars recently have claimed that originalism informed the early Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation. This Article finds that contemporary filters do not capture the essence of eighteenth-century constitutional adjudication. Like modern textualists, the Justices of the
Chisholm Court begin their inquiries with an examination of the constitutional text. However, the constitutional text rarely provided clear constraints on the early Court’s discretion because, to borrow language from New Originalists, their cases arose in the “zone of construction” where original meaning “runs out.” Justices chose among plausible arguments about the Constitution’s meaning. At key points, the Justices simply declared what the law was. They did so, not without justification, but also not based on evidence of the Framers’ intent or the original meaning of the constitutional text.

Keywords: Supreme Court, Seriatim Opinions, Constitutional Interpretation, Pluralism, Legal History, Eleventh Amendment, Originalism, Living Constitutionalism, Precedent, John Jay, James Iredell, James Wilson, Constitutional Law, State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty

Suggested Citation

Telman, D.A. Jeremy, Originalism and Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning in Chisholm v. Georgia (January 24, 2019). Cleveland State Law Review, Forthcoming; Valparaiso University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321916

D.A. Jeremy Telman (Contact Author)

Valparaiso University Law School ( email )

656 S. Greenwich St.
Valparaiso, IN 46383-6493
United States
219-465-7811 (Phone)
219-465-7872 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.valpo.edu/law/faculty/jtelman/

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