Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure

Posted: 16 Oct 2002

See all articles by Brian J. Bushee

Brian J. Bushee

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Dawn A. Matsumoto

University of Washington - Department of Accounting

Gregory S. Miller

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

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Abstract

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., "open" conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.

Keywords: conference calls, corporate disclosure, selective disclosure, price volatility, institutional investors

JEL Classification: M41, M44, G12, G14, G39, K22

Suggested Citation

Bushee, Brian J. and Matsumoto, Dawn and Miller, Gregory S., Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 34, Nos. 1-3, pp. 149-180, January 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=332201

Brian J. Bushee (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-4872 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Dawn Matsumoto

University of Washington - Department of Accounting ( email )

224 Mackenzie Hall, Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-543-4454 (Phone)
206-685-9392 (Fax)

Gregory S. Miller

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

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