Discussion of 'Compensation Policy and Discretionary Disclosure'

Posted: 18 Jan 2003

See all articles by Mary E. Barth

Mary E. Barth

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business


Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2002) posits that stock-based compensation motivates managers to increase public disclosure of their private information. The hypothesis is intriguing and new to the literature, and the findings are consistent with it. However, developing the hypothesis depends on some unsupported assumptions and the link between the hypothesis and the empirical evidence is indirect, raising concerns about the validity of the study's inferences about the effects on disclosure of stock-based comp ensation.

Keywords: stock-based compensation, management incentives, disclosure

JEL Classification: M41, M45, D82, J33

Suggested Citation

Barth, Mary E., Discussion of 'Compensation Policy and Discretionary Disclosure'. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 34, Nos. 1-3, pp. 311-318, January 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=332221

Mary E. Barth (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9040 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library


Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics