The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment

14 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2002 Last revised: 29 Oct 2010

See all articles by Martin S. Feldstein

Martin S. Feldstein

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (deceased); Harvard University (deceased)

Date Written: September 2002

Abstract

Although there is now widespread agreement in the economics profession that discretionary counter-cyclical'fiscal policy has not contributed to economic stability and may have actually been destabilizing at particular times in the past, there is one important condition when discretionary fiscal policy can play a constructive role: in a sustained downturn when aggregate demand and interest rates are low and when prices are falling or may soon be falling. This short note begins by summarizing the general case against using fiscal policy for stabilization. It next considers the argument for using a hyperexpansive' monetary policy to reduce the risk that a low rate of inflation will lead to a deflationary situation in which monetary policy becomes ineffective. Such a policy would increase the risk of asset price bubbles and of a misaligned exchange rate. Discretionary fiscal policy provides an alternative way to stimulate the economy when aggregate demand and interest rates are low and when prices are falling or may soon be falling. A stimulus can be achieved without increasing budget deficits if the fiscal policy acts by providing an incentive for increased private spending. Specific examples for the U.S. and Japan are considered.

Suggested Citation

Feldstein, Martin S., The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment (September 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9203, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=332247

Martin S. Feldstein (Contact Author)

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