Rac(g)e Against the Machine?: Social Incentives When Humans Meet Robots

GATE WP 1904 – January 2019

Posted: 8 Feb 2019 Last revised: 22 Feb 2019

See all articles by Brice Corgnet

Brice Corgnet

University of Saint Etienne - Analysis Group and Economic Theory Lyon St-Etienne (GATE-LSE)

Roberto Hernán-González

Burgundy School of Business

Ricardo Mateo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: January 28, 2019

Abstract

Because work is most often performed in a social context, social incentives are key to understand incentive setting in firms. We assess the strength of social incentives, which critically depend on the extent of social preferences and social pressure at work, by assessing the difference in human performance when people complete a sequential task with either other humans or robots. We find evidence that, despite maintaining monetary incentives intact, humans who work with robots underperform those who work with other humans, especially under team pay. The lack of altruism toward robots and the lack of social pressure exerted by robots are key to explain this negative effect under team pay. Under piece rate, the lack of envy toward robots plays a crucial role. Regardless of the payment scheme, our findings show that social incentives are powerful. Accounting for the weakening of social incentives when assessing the cost-efficiency of replacing humans with robots is thus critical.

Keywords: Incentives, Social Pressure, Social Preferences, Personnel Economics, Organizational Behavior, Automation

JEL Classification: C92, D23, D91, M52

Suggested Citation

Corgnet, Brice and Hernán-González, Roberto and Mateo, Ricardo, Rac(g)e Against the Machine?: Social Incentives When Humans Meet Robots (January 28, 2019). GATE WP 1904 – January 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324169

Brice Corgnet (Contact Author)

University of Saint Etienne - Analysis Group and Economic Theory Lyon St-Etienne (GATE-LSE) ( email )

Lyon
France

Roberto Hernán-González

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

Ricardo Mateo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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