Partial Language Competence
30 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2019
Date Written: January 2019
This paper proposes an equilibrium concept, Language-Based Expectation Equilibrium, which accounts for partial language understanding in sender-receiver cheap talk games. Each player has a privately known language competence representing all the messages that he understands. For the messages he does not understand, he has correct but coarse expectations about the equilibrium strategies of the other player. In general, a language-based expectation equilibrium outcome differs from Nash and communication equilibrium outcomes, but is always a Bayesian solution. Partial language competence of the sender rationalizes information transmission and lies in pure persuasion problems, and facilitates information transmission from a moderately biased sender.
Keywords: analogy-based expectations, Bayesian solution, bounded rationality, cheap talk, Language
JEL Classification: C72, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation