Is Police Behavior Getting Worse? Data Selection and the Measurement of Policing Harms

52 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2019 Last revised: 30 Jun 2020

See all articles by Aurelie Ouss

Aurelie Ouss

University of Pennsylvania

John Rappaport

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: December 11, 2019


Public concern about harmful policing is surging. Governments are paying historic amounts for law enforcement liability. Has police behavior changed? Or is society responding differently? Traditional data sources struggle with this question. Common metrics conflate the prevalence and severity of policing harms with the responses of legal actors such as lawyers, judges, and juries. We overcome this problem using a new data source: liability insurance claims. Our dataset contains 23 years of claims against roughly 350 law enforcement agencies that contract with a single insurer. We find that, while lawsuits and payouts have trended upwards over the past decade, insurance claims have declined. We examine multiple potential explanations. We argue that, in our sample, police behavior is not getting worse; rather, societal responses to policing harms are intensifying. Police litigation is not representative of the broader universe of claims and adjudicated claims also differ systematically from settled ones.

Keywords: Police, police misconduct, copwatching, insurance, municipal liability, civil rights

JEL Classification: K14

Suggested Citation

Ouss, Aurelie and Rappaport, John, Is Police Behavior Getting Worse? Data Selection and the Measurement of Policing Harms (December 11, 2019). Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 49, p. 153 (2020), University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 865, U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 693, Available at SSRN: or

Aurelie Ouss

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

John Rappaport (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-7194 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)


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