A Cry for Certainty as to the Application of “Accrued to” for Purposes of Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 – M v CSARS
Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, Vol. 81, p. 484-497, 2018
14 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2019
Date Written: August 1, 2018
For quite a long period controversy ruled over the interpretation of the concept of “accrued to”. The uncertainty was whether the concept means that the taxpayer must be entitled to an amount or that the amount must be due and payable. In CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 353 (A) this uncertainty appears to have been cleared where the court reiterated the Lategan-principle (see Lategan v CIR 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16) and ruled that the concept “accrued to” denotes that the taxpayer must be unconditionally entitled to an amount. In the recent judgment of M v CSARS (14005)  ZATC 1(30 May 2017) it seems as if the certainty as to the application of the Lategan-principle – or what jurists perceived as final certainty – is not so clear, certain and understandable after all. This case note critically examines the judgment in M v CSARS with specific reference to the time of accrual of the proceeds of the sale of immovable property.
Keywords: tax law, “accrue”, proceeds of immovable property
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