Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees

GATE WP 1906 – January 2019

41 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2019

See all articles by Mostapha Diss

Mostapha Diss

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Muhammad Mahajne

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Date Written: February 1, 2019

Abstract

We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.

Keywords: Voting, Multiwinner Elections, Committee, Condorcet, Social Acceptability

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Diss, Mostapha and Mahajne, Muhammad, Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees (February 1, 2019). GATE WP 1906 – January 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3327169

Mostapha Diss (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Muhammad Mahajne

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev ( email )

1 Ben-Gurion Blvd
Beer-Sheba 84105, 84105
Israel

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