Papering Over the Cracks: The GCEU Judgement in Case T-851/14 Slovak Telekom v Commission

12 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2019

See all articles by Damien Geradin

Damien Geradin

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); EUCLID Law; University College London - Faculty of Laws

Robert O'Donoghue

Brick Court Chambers

Date Written: February 4, 2019

Abstract

On 15 October 2014, the European Commission adopted a decision finding that Slovak Telekom breached Article 102 TFEU for its refusal to provide unbundled access to its local loops, as well as its margin squeeze of alternative operators in the provision of unbundled access to its local loops. On 13 December 2018, GCEU adopted its judgement on the appeal brought by Slovak Telekom. The GCEU confirms the Commission’s decision that the Slovak Telekom had breached Article 102 TFEU by engaging in constructive refusal to supply and margin squeeze. This paper reviews the main arguments that ST raised in its appeal against the Commission decision, and analyses the response of the GCEU to these arguments, and in the process provides commentary and critique on the GCEU judgment. It argues that this judgement is a missed opportunity as it fails to engage with the fundamental issues of principles raised by Slovak Telekom in its appeal.

Keywords: Competition, antitrust, refusal to supply, margin squeeze, regulation, LRAIC

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L43, L51

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and O'Donoghue, Robert, Papering Over the Cracks: The GCEU Judgement in Case T-851/14 Slovak Telekom v Commission (February 4, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3328476 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3328476

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

EUCLID Law ( email )

Brussels
Belgium

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Gower St
London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Robert O'Donoghue

Brick Court Chambers

7 - 8 Essex St.
London, WC2R 3LD
United Kingdom

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