Electoral Competition and Factional Sabotage

54 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2019 Last revised: 18 Sep 2020

See all articles by Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: March 26, 2019

Abstract

Intra-party sabotage is a widespread phenomenon that undermines the strength of political parties. What brings opposing factions to engage in sabotage rather than working to enhance the party image, and what strategies can parties adopt to contain it? I study a model of elections in which intra-party factions can devote resources to campaign for the party or to undermine each other and obtain more power. The party redistributes electoral spoils among factions to motivate their investment in campaigning activities. The model shows that sabotage increases when the stakes of the election are low — e.g. in consensus democracies that grant power to the losing party — because the incentives to focus on the fight for internal power increase. It also suggests that the optimal party strategy for winning the election in the face of intra-party competition is to reward factions with high powered incentives when campaigning effort can be easily monitored, but treat factions equally otherwise.

Keywords: Factions, Party Organization, Electoral Competition, Sabotage

Suggested Citation

Invernizzi, Giovanna Maria, Electoral Competition and Factional Sabotage (March 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329622

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

New York, NY
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
188
Abstract Views
968
rank
179,257
PlumX Metrics