A Model of Electoral Competition With Factional Sabotage

44 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2019

See all articles by Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: February 5, 2019


I examine the interaction between party leadership and factions in a probabilistic model of electoral competition. Factions can devote their campaign resources to either promote the party or to undermine other factions. Before the election, leaders decide how to redistribute electoral spoils among factions. The model studies how the intra-party and inter-party competitive environment affect the occurrence of sabotage and the response of leaders via changes in party organizations. As electoral security and the electoral spoils granted to the losing party increase, the salience of the intra-party contest relative to the inter-party contest in the general election increases, as does equilibrium sabotage by factions. The party leadership averts sabotage by designing optimal incentive schemes that lead factions to internalize the cost of working against the party. The model helps to rationalize the occurrence of political scandals driven by intra-party sabotage, and the observed dispersion in party organizational structure.

Keywords: Factions, Party Organization, Electoral Competition, Sabotage

Suggested Citation

Invernizzi, Giovanna Maria, A Model of Electoral Competition With Factional Sabotage (February 5, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329622

Giovanna Maria Invernizzi (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

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