The Hidden Costs of Securing Innovation: The Manifold Impacts of Compulsory Invention Secrecy

80 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2019 Last revised: 3 Oct 2022

See all articles by Daniel P. Gross

Daniel P. Gross

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 12, 2022

Abstract

One of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) most commanding powers is to compel inventions into secrecy, withholding patent rights and prohibiting disclosure, to prevent technology from leaking to foreign competitors. This paper studies the impacts of compulsory secrecy on firm invention and the wider innovation system. In World War II, USPTO issued secrecy orders to 11,000 patent applications, which it rescinded en masse at the end of the war. Compulsory secrecy caused implicated firms to shift their patenting away from treated classes, with effects persisting through at least 1960. It also restricted commercialization and impeded follow-on innovation. Yet it appears it was effective at keeping sensitive technology out of public view. The results provide insight into the effectiveness of compulsory secrecy as a regulatory strategy and into the roles, and impacts, of formal intellectual property in the innovation system.

Keywords: Compulsory secrecy; Invention secrecy; National security; World War II

JEL Classification: O31, O32, O34, O38, N42, N72

Suggested Citation

Gross, Daniel P., The Hidden Costs of Securing Innovation: The Manifold Impacts of Compulsory Invention Secrecy (April 12, 2022). Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 19-090, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329912 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329912

Daniel P. Gross (Contact Author)

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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