The Decision to Investigate Mergers in the UK's Voluntary Regime

Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2017, Pages 637–665

17 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2019

See all articles by Simon Chisholm

Simon Chisholm

Charles River Associates

Tom Heideman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: April 13, 2017

Abstract

As merging parties can choose whether to notify their transaction in the UK, the competition authority has a well-developed procedure for capturing those that are not notified but may raise concerns. The resulting own-initiative investigations account for a significant proportion of overall UK merger enforcement. This mergers intelligence function is crucial to the voluntary regime working effectively, yet relatively little is known publicly about this preliminary investigative phase. We provide an overview of how the decision to investigate is taken, including the extent of transactions reviewed at this stage, an overview of the decision making process, and an assessment of recent reforms to the process. We go on to analyse the extent to which decisions taken (not) to investigate are appealable.

Keywords: Mergers, Voluntary regime, Competition law

JEL Classification: K21, H11

Suggested Citation

Chisholm, Simon and Heideman, Tom, The Decision to Investigate Mergers in the UK's Voluntary Regime (April 13, 2017). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2017, Pages 637–665. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329931 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329931

Simon Chisholm (Contact Author)

Charles River Associates

CRAI
8 Finsbury Circus
London, City of London EC2M 7EA
United Kingdom
7584328267 (Phone)

Tom Heideman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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