Open Plurilateral Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation and the WTO

31 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2019

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Charles Sabel

Columbia University - Columbia Law School

Date Written: February 2019

Abstract

Sustained high growth in many developing countries (‘the rise of the rest’) combined with long-standing WTO working practices hampers the ability of the WTO to perform its routine functions and paralyzes efforts to adapt to new circumstances. Preferential trade agreements have taken up some of the slack in addressing differences in domestic regulation of product safety, environmental and social conditions, but are exclusionary and inefficient from a global perspective. In this paper, we argue that a new type of agreement based on open plurilateral cooperation offers better prospects for groups of countries to explore and develop their potential common interests on regulatory matters, while safeguarding core aspects of their national regulatory sovereignty and in-creasing the possibility of regenerating the WTO from within.

Keywords: regulation, international cooperation, trade, WTO, plurilateral agreements

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Sabel, Charles Frederick, Open Plurilateral Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation and the WTO (February 2019). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2019/10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3330580 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3330580

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Charles Frederick Sabel

Columbia University - Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-2618 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

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