Strategy-Proofness and 'Median Voters'

Dept. of Economics and Finance Working Paper No. 72

Posted: 18 Sep 1996

See all articles by Stephen Ching

Stephen Ching

School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong

Date Written: December 1995

Abstract

We consider the problem of choosing a level of the public good for an economy in which agents have continuous and single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948). We show that a solution satisfying strategy-proofness and continuity if and only if it is an augmented median-voter solution. An augmented median-voter solution is described in terms of 2^n parameters (which satisfy an anti-monotonicity condition) as follows: n+1 of them are selected according to an increasing order of the peaks; the outcome is the median of these n+1 parameters and the n peaks. This result establishes a formal connection between strategy-proofness and a generalized notion of median voter. (Similar median formulas were used by Moulin (1980) to describe smaller classes of solutions.) We provide an interpretation of these 2^n parameters in terms of the following properties: anonymity, voter sovereignty, unanimity, and Pareto efficiency.

JEL Classification: D7, D8

Suggested Citation

Ching, Stephen, Strategy-Proofness and 'Median Voters' (December 1995). Dept. of Economics and Finance Working Paper No. 72, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331

Stephen Ching (Contact Author)

School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong

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