Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest

39 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2019

Date Written: June 7, 2018

Abstract

This paper provides a complete first-order characterization of equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s model when the conflict of interest is small. This exercise allows us to deepen our understanding of how a state-dependent bias and a non-uniform distribution influence the precision with which different states of the world are communicated. We illustrate our approach in some applications.

Keywords: Strategic Communication, Small Bias

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Dilme, Francesc, Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (June 7, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3331084

Francesc Dilme (Contact Author)

University of Bonn ( email )

Lennestrasse 35
53113 Bonn
Germany
0049228737957 (Phone)

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