College Athletics: The Chink in the Seventh Circuit's 'Law and Economics' Armor

117 Michigan Law Review Online 90 (2019)

14 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2019 Last revised: 12 Nov 2019

See all articles by Michael A. Carrier

Michael A. Carrier

Rutgers Law School

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law; Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: February 3, 2019


If any court is linked to the “law and economics” movement, it is the Seventh Circuit, home of former Judge Richard Posner, the “Chicago School,” and analysis based on markets and economics. It thus comes as a surprise that in college-athletics cases, the court has replaced economic analysis with legal formalisms. In adopting a deferential approach that would uphold nearly every rule the NCAA claims is related to amateurism, the court recalls the pre-Chicago School era, in which courts aggressively applied “per se” illegality based on a restraint’s form, rather than substance. While the Seventh Circuit’s detour of deference has taken several stops, this Essay focuses on the most recent, the 2018 decision in Deppe v. NCAA.

In Deppe, a college football punter who believed he would receive an athletic scholarship transferred after learning that he would not. Pursuant to the NCAA’s “year in residence” rule, the punter was forced to sit out for one year before he could play for his new school. The punter claimed that the NCAA’s rule violated antitrust law. But the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the rule was “presumptively procompetitive.”

The Seventh Circuit’s ruling suffered from four critical flaws. First, the court misread antitrust precedent, relying on dicta from a decades-old Supreme Court case addressing a different issue to manufacture a wholly new analytical framework. Second, the court misconstrued antitrust law by neglecting the longstanding “Rule of Reason” analysis that involves burden shifting and emphasizes consumer welfare. Third, the Seventh Circuit ignored the procedural setting of a motion to dismiss, making up facts benefiting the defendant rather than — as hornbook law makes clear — applying facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. And fourth, the court neglected the economics that would have shown the anticompetitive nature of the year-in-residence restriction on student-athletes’ movement between schools.

In short, the court upheld a restraint that could harm student-athletes, colleges, and sports fans by applying unsupported rigid rules rather than considering a market’s economic realities. The Seventh Circuit would benefit from returning to its law and economics roots.

Keywords: NCAA, College Sports, Antitrust, Amateurism, Student-Athletes, Rule of Reason

JEL Classification: D40, D42, K21, L40, L41, L44, L83, O34

Suggested Citation

Carrier, Michael A. and Edelman, Marc, College Athletics: The Chink in the Seventh Circuit's 'Law and Economics' Armor (February 3, 2019). 117 Michigan Law Review Online 90 (2019), Available at SSRN: or

Michael A. Carrier (Contact Author)

Rutgers Law School ( email )

217 North Fifth Street
Camden, NJ 08102-1203
United States
856-225-6380 (Phone)
856-225-6516 (Fax)

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania ( email )

3730 Walnut Street
Suite 600
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics