Strict Id Laws Don't Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008–2018

99 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2019 Last revised: 19 Nov 2021

See all articles by Enrico Cantoni

Enrico Cantoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Vincent Pons

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Date Written: February 2019

Abstract

U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.6-billion-observations panel dataset, 2008–2018, we find that the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications. Our most demanding specification controls for state, year, and voter fixed effects, along with state and voter time-varying controls. Based on this specification, we obtain point estimates of -0.1 percentage point for effects both on overall registration and turnout (with 95 percent confidence intervals of [-2.3; 2.1pp] and [-3.0; 2.8pp], respectively), and +1.4pp for the effect on the turnout of non-white voters relative to whites (with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.5; 3.2pp]). The lack of negative impact on voter turnout cannot be attributed to voters’ reaction against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. However, the likelihood that non-white voters were contacted by a campaign increases by 4.7 percentage points, suggesting that parties’ mobilization might have offset modest effects of the laws on the participation of ethnic minorities. Finally, strict ID requirements have no effect on fraud – actual or perceived. Overall, our findings suggest that efforts to improve elections may be better directed at other reforms.

Suggested Citation

Cantoni, Enrico and Pons, Vincent, Strict Id Laws Don't Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008–2018 (February 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25522, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332269

Enrico Cantoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

Vincent Pons

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

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