Promoting Socially Desirable Behaviors: Experimental Comparison of the Procedures of Persuasion and Commitment

GATE WP 1907 – February 2019

22 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2019

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GATE Working Paper Series

Université de Lyon - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon Saint-Etienne (GATE)

Cécile Bazart

University of Montpellier

Mathieu Lefebvre

University of Strasbourg

Julie Rosaz

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Date Written: February 11, 2019

Abstract

In a series of experiments, we test the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to, respectively, four manipulation treatments relying on: an information strategy, a low commitment strategy, a high commitment strategy and a promise strategy. We confirm the advantages of psychologically orientated policies as they increase the overall level of contribution and for some, that is commitment and promises, question the decreasing trend traditionally observed in long term contributions to public goods.

Keywords: Experiment, Persuasion, Commitment, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

JEL Classification: C91, D91, H41

Suggested Citation

Working Paper Series, GATE and Bazart, Cécile and Lefebvre, Mathieu and Rosaz, Julie, Promoting Socially Desirable Behaviors: Experimental Comparison of the Procedures of Persuasion and Commitment (February 11, 2019). GATE WP 1907 – February 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333182 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3333182

GATE Working Paper Series (Contact Author)

Université de Lyon - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon Saint-Etienne (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/

Cécile Bazart

University of Montpellier ( email )

163 rue Auguste Broussonnet
France

Mathieu Lefebvre

University of Strasbourg

61, avenue de la foret noire
Strasbourg, Alsace 3000
France

Julie Rosaz

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

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