Disclosure Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership

This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.

Keywords: Disclosure, Common Ownership, Externalities, Propreitary Costs, Market Liquidity

JEL Classification: D62, D82, G34, M41

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Park, Jihwon and Sani, Jalal and Shroff, Nemit and White, Hal D., Disclosure Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership (February 12, 2019). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Vol. 67, No. 2-3, pp. 387-415, April-May 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333451