Disclosure Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership
64 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2019 Last revised: 29 Jul 2019
Date Written: February 12, 2019
This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.
Keywords: Disclosure, Common Ownership, Externalities, Propreitary Costs, Market Liquidity
JEL Classification: D62, D82, G34, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation