Exclusionary Conduct in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy

Forthcoming in: Marco Botta (ed.), EU Competition Law Remedies in Data Economy, Springer 2019

Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-04

41 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2019

See all articles by Vikas Kathuria

Vikas Kathuria

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Jure Globocnik

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: February 18, 2019

Abstract

The natural consequence of finding an infringement of Article 102 TFEU is to offset the harm to consumer welfare by restoring competition through effective remedies. As big data constitutes the most vital resource in data-driven markets, a dominant undertaking can exclude its rivals from accessing user data and thus deprive them of scale in markets that are characterised by network effects. Indeed, the European Commission found Google guilty of excluding its rivals in the Android licensing case by adopting this strategy. It is, however, unclear as to which remedy can most efficiently restore competition in such cases. This paper analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing as a remedy to restore competition in the affected market. The paper approaches this research question from both theoretical and practical standpoints. First, it analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing remedy from legal, economic and, technological perspective, followed by an assessment of such a remedy within the framework of the GDPR. Based on this comprehensive investigation, it concludes that mandatory data sharing is not the optimal solution to remedy loss to consumer welfare. In view of this, reliance can be placed on other behavioural and structural remedies.

Keywords: Exclusionary conduct, big data, remedies, Google, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

JEL Classification: K21, L12, K42

Suggested Citation

Kathuria, Vikas and Globocnik, Jure, Exclusionary Conduct in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy (February 18, 2019). Forthcoming in: Marco Botta (ed.), EU Competition Law Remedies in Data Economy, Springer 2019; Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337524

Vikas Kathuria (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Jure Globocnik

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
M√ľnchen, Bayern 80539
Germany

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