Overlapping Climate Clubs Under Transaction Costs

39 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2019

See all articles by Emilson Delfino Silva

Emilson Delfino Silva

University of Alberta - Department of Marketing, Business Economics & Law

Chikara Yamaguchi

Hiroshima University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2018


We examine the formation of multilateral, hub-and-spoke and bilateral international R&D strategic alliances (overlapping climate clubs) to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision in clubs produces two types of positive externalities: a global public good (i.e., reduction of CO2 emissions) and knowledge spillovers in joint R&D agreements. The latter is a club good. It is perfectly excludable. Its (direct) benefits are enjoyed by the club members only. Trust plays a central role in the type of alliance formation, if any at all. Lack of trust generates transaction costs, which increase with the number of R&D collaborators. We utilize the perfectly-coalition-proof-Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria. Multilateral and hub-and-spoke coalitional structures are PCPNE, even in large economies containing all nations in the globe, in the absence of income transfers, for different values of transaction costs. With income transfers, fully participated multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands.

Keywords: climate change, climate clubs, trust, coalition-proof equilibrium, overlapping coalitions, carbon capture and storage, hub-and-spoke, international environmental agreements

JEL Classification: C700, D600, D700, H400, H700, Q400, R500

Suggested Citation

Delfino Silva, Emilson and Yamaguchi, Chikara, Overlapping Climate Clubs Under Transaction Costs (2018). CESifo Working Paper No. 7319. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338648

Emilson Delfino Silva (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Marketing, Business Economics & Law ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6

Chikara Yamaguchi

Hiroshima University ( email )

Higashi-Hiroshima, Hiroshima 739-8525

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