Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis

61 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2019

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Valentin Lang

University of Zurich

Beata Smarzynska Javorcik

University of Oxford - Department of Economics; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries’ votes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Introducing new data on voting behavior in the UNSC over the 1960-2015 period, our results show that states allied with the US receive more bilateral aid when voting in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of states less allied with the US are rewarded with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not receive such perks.

Keywords: United Nations Security Council, voting, aid, IMF

JEL Classification: O110, O190, F350

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Lang, Valentin and Smarzynska Javorcik, Beata and Vreeland, James Raymond, Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis (2018). CESifo Working Paper No. 7329, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338658 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338658

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Valentin Lang

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Beata Smarzynska Javorcik

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ( email )

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com

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