Salience of Inherited Wealth and the Support for Inheritance Taxation

59 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2019

See all articles by Spencer Bastani

Spencer Bastani

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation; Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Daniel Waldenström

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

We study how attitudes to inheritance taxation are influenced by information about the role of inherited wealth in society. Using a randomized experiment in a register-linked Swedish survey, we find that informing individuals about the large aggregate importance of inherited wealth and its link to inequality of opportunity significantly increases the support for inheritance taxation. The effect is almost uniform across socio-economic groups and survives a battery of robustness tests. Changes in the perceived economic importance of inherited wealth and altered views on whether luck matters most for economic success appear to be the main driving factors behind the treatment effect. Our findings suggest that the low salience of inherited wealth could be one explanation behind the relatively marginalized role of inheritance taxation in developed economies.

Keywords: capital taxation, tax attitudes, equality of opportunity, randomized experiment

JEL Classification: D310, H200, H310

Suggested Citation

Bastani, Spencer and Waldenström, Daniel, Salience of Inherited Wealth and the Support for Inheritance Taxation (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7482, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338837

Spencer Bastani (Contact Author)

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation ( email )

Box 513
751 20 Uppsala
Sweden

Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Växjö, 351 06
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Daniel Waldenström

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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