Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract

42 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2019

See all articles by Matthias Efing

Matthias Efing

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Harald Hau

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Patrick Kampkötter

University of Tuebingen - Department of Managerial Accounting

Jean-Charles Rochet

GFRI, University of Geneva; Swiss Finance Institute; University of Zurich - Swiss Banking Institute (ISB)

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

We argue that risk sharing motivates the bank-wide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs earnings shocks. Using payroll data for 1:26 million employee-years in all functional divisions of Austrian, German, and Swiss banks, we uncover several empirical patterns in bonus pay that are difficult to rationalize with incentive theories of bonus pay - but support an important risk sharing motive. In particular, bonuses respond to performance shocks that are outside the control of employees because they originate in other bank divisions or even outside the bank.

Keywords: banker compensation, risk sharing, bonus pay, operating leverage

JEL Classification: G200, G210, D220

Suggested Citation

Efing, Matthias and Hau, Harald and Kampkötter, Patrick and Rochet, Jean-Charles, Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7495. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338851

Matthias Efing (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Harald Hau

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Patrick Kampkötter

University of Tuebingen - Department of Managerial Accounting ( email )

Germany

Jean-Charles Rochet

GFRI, University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

University of Zurich - Swiss Banking Institute (ISB) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
CH-8032 Zurich, Zurich 8032
Switzerland

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