The Anatomy of Block Accumulations by Activist Shareholders

56 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2019 Last revised: 26 Sep 2019

See all articles by Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal

Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal

Luxembourg School of Finance

Jan Schnitzler

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: February 20, 2019

Abstract

We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.

Keywords: Investor Activism, Activist Blockholders, Hedge Funds, Stock Ownership

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf von and Schnitzler, Jan, The Anatomy of Block Accumulations by Activist Shareholders (February 20, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339182 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339182

Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal

Luxembourg School of Finance ( email )

162a, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg-Limpertsberg, L-1511
Luxembourg

Jan Schnitzler (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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