The Anatomy of Block Accumulations by Activist Shareholders

56 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2019 Last revised: 26 Sep 2019

See all articles by Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal

Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal

Luxembourg School of Finance

Jan Schnitzler

Grenoble Ecole de Management

Date Written: February 20, 2019

Abstract

We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.

Keywords: Investor Activism, Activist Blockholders, Hedge Funds, Stock Ownership

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf von and Schnitzler, Jan, The Anatomy of Block Accumulations by Activist Shareholders (February 20, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339182 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339182

Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal

Luxembourg School of Finance ( email )

162a, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg-Limpertsberg, L-1511
Luxembourg

Jan Schnitzler (Contact Author)

Grenoble Ecole de Management ( email )

12 Rue Pierre Semard
Grenoble, Cedex 01 38000
France

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
62
Abstract Views
601
rank
398,782
PlumX Metrics