Who pays a visit to Brussels? Firm value effects of cross-border political access to European Commissioners

40 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2019 Last revised: 26 Oct 2022

See all articles by Kizkitza Biguri

Kizkitza Biguri

Oslo Business School - OsloMet

Jörg Stahl

Católica Lisbon School of Business & Economics

Date Written: June 1, 2022

Abstract

We analyze meetings of firms with policymakers at the European Commission (EC). Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns for US firms. Firms of the European Union (EU), however, do not experience significant value increases. We identify regulatory outcomes as a channel that can rationalize this difference in value effects of political access. US firms with meetings are more likely to receive favorable decisions in their EC merger decisions than their EU peers. The results suggest that cross-border political access can alleviate uncertainties and alleged discriminatory behavior of regulators in foreign markets.

Keywords: Cross-border political access, European Commission, firm value

JEL Classification: D72, G30

Suggested Citation

Biguri, Kizkitza and Stahl, Jörg, Who pays a visit to Brussels? Firm value effects of cross-border political access to European Commissioners (June 1, 2022). LawFin Working Paper No. 9, Proceedings of the EUROFIDAI-ESSEC Paris December Finance Meeting 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339871

Kizkitza Biguri

Oslo Business School - OsloMet ( email )

P.O. Box 4
Oslo, 0130
Norway
+47 46410566 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/kizkitzabiguri/home

Jörg Stahl (Contact Author)

Católica Lisbon School of Business & Economics ( email )

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