Games with Information Constraints: Seeds and Spillovers

66 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2019 Last revised: 20 Jul 2023

See all articles by Simone Galperti

Simone Galperti

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics

Jacopo Perego

Columbia University

Date Written: July 19, 2023

Abstract

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a “revelation-principle” result for settings in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are more restrictive and which seeds are more influential. Moreover, it generates predictions that hold robustly under a general class of spillover processes, which includes strategic communication. We apply our results to a problem of optimal organization design.

Keywords: Information, Spillovers, Seeding, Networks, Correlated Equilibrium

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83, D85, M3

Suggested Citation

Galperti, Simone and Perego, Jacopo, Games with Information Constraints: Seeds and Spillovers (July 19, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340090. or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340090

Simone Galperti (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States

Jacopo Perego

Columbia University ( email )

116th and Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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