Shaping Corporate Actions through Targeted Transparency Regulation: A Framework and Review of Extant Evidence

Schmalenbach Business Review, Forthcoming

42 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2019

See all articles by Katharina Hombach

Katharina Hombach

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg

Thorsten Sellhorn

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet (LMU) Munich

Date Written: November 2018

Abstract

This paper discusses targeted transparency regulation by securities regulators: corporate disclosure regulation aimed at nudging firms towards changing their business activities in socially desirable ways. Using Corporate Social Responsibility disclosures and other prominent examples, we first document disclosure regulators’ public policy objectives. Based on a framework that develops the causal chain linking a disclosure mandate to the desired corporate action, we review empirical evidence on the effectiveness of targeted transparency implemented via securities regulation. The paper concludes with a discussion of opportunities and challenges for future research in this area.

Keywords: disclosure, transparency, public policy, CSR, real effects

JEL Classification: M14, M48, Q38, Q56

Suggested Citation

Hombach, Katharina and Sellhorn, Thorsten, Shaping Corporate Actions through Targeted Transparency Regulation: A Framework and Review of Extant Evidence (November 2018). Schmalenbach Business Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340649

Katharina Hombach (Contact Author)

Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg ( email )

Ammerländer Heerstraße 114-118
Oldenburg, 26129
Germany

Thorsten Sellhorn

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet (LMU) Munich ( email )

Ludwigstr. 28 RG IV
Munich, Bavaria 80539
Germany
+49(0)89-21806264 (Phone)
+49(0)89-21806327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rwp.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/personen/professoren/sellhorn/index.html

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