Public Attention to Gender Equality and Board Gender Diversity

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 667/2020

55 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2019 Last revised: 16 Dec 2021

See all articles by Mariassunta Giannetti

Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Tracy Yue Wang

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 6, 2021

Abstract

We document that heightened public attention to gender equality is associated with an increase in board gender diversity. Improvements in diversity are more pronounced in firms with a corporate culture that is already sympathetic to gender equality. When public attention to gender equality increases, firms reach out to a larger pool of women, such as women without industry experience or outside their network, but female director appointments do not appear to be dilutive of the board’s skills. Instead, we observe less reliance on connections for director appointments and a decrease in the propensity to appoint connected men.

Keywords: Boards, Gender, Public Attention, Networks, Connections, Homophily, Corporate Culture

JEL Classification: G3, M5, D22

Suggested Citation

Giannetti, Mariassunta and Wang, Tracy Yue, Public Attention to Gender Equality and Board Gender Diversity (November 6, 2021). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 667/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341518 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3341518

Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mariassuntagiannetti/Home

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Tracy Yue Wang (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

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