An Empirical Analysis of College Admissions with Endogenous Entrance Exam Scores

60 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2019 Last revised: 18 Mar 2022

See all articles by Hayri Alper Arslan

Hayri Alper Arslan

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 18, 2022

Abstract

This paper develops a method for identifying and estimating student preferences in centralized matching mechanisms when students are ranked by exam scores. In such mechanisms, exam scores contain important information for inferring students' heterogeneous preferences because students have incentives to choose their effort levels to obtain a score that maximizes their total gain in the admissions process. I show that ignoring the information embedded in effort choices causes biased estimates in Turkey where there is empirical evidence that students respond to the preparation incentives. I discuss the objectives of these mechanisms and suggest relevant policies to increase students' welfare.

Keywords: School Choice, Centralized College Admissions, Preference Estimation, Endogenous Exam Scores

JEL Classification: C57, C78, D02

Suggested Citation

Arslan, Hayri Alper, An Empirical Analysis of College Admissions with Endogenous Entrance Exam Scores (March 18, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3346459

Hayri Alper Arslan (Contact Author)

University of Texas at San Antonio - College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

6900 North Loop 1604 West
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States

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