Women on Bank Boards: Evidence from Gender Quotas around the World

60 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2019 Last revised: 5 Jul 2021

See all articles by Rose C. Liao

Rose C. Liao

Rutgers University, Newark, School of Business-Newark, Department of Finance & Economics

Gilberto R. Loureiro

University of Minho - School of Economics and Management

Alvaro G. Taboada

Mississippi State University

Date Written: December 10, 2019

Abstract

Using a sample of 469 banks from 39 countries between 2008 and 2017 and a generalized difference-in-differences methodology, we show that board gender quota laws lead to increased female board representation. We find an increase in risk taking and systemic risk and worse long-run operating performance post quota law for banks most impacted by the reforms, and those located in countries with a smaller pool of qualified women executives. Results suggest that the addition of younger and less experienced female board members to important board committees due labor market constraints drive the risk taking and performance outcomes.

Keywords: Gender quotas, director independence, bank risk taking, bank performance

JEL Classification: G15, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Liao, Rose C. and Loureiro, Gilberto R. and Taboada, Alvaro G., Women on Bank Boards: Evidence from Gender Quotas around the World (December 10, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346672 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3346672

Rose C. Liao

Rutgers University, Newark, School of Business-Newark, Department of Finance & Economics ( email )

1 Washington Park
Newark, NJ 07102
United States

Gilberto R. Loureiro

University of Minho - School of Economics and Management ( email )

Campus Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal
+351-253-605553 (Phone)
+351-253-601380 (Fax)

Alvaro G. Taboada (Contact Author)

Mississippi State University ( email )

310-H McCool Hall
PO Box 9580
Mississippi State, MS 39762
United States
662-325-6716 (Phone)
662-325-1977 (Fax)

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