Perceived Audit Quality and Firm Value: Evidence From Investors’ Reaction to the Revelation of Limiting Liability Agreements in Audit Engagement Letters

55 Pages Posted: 7 May 2019

See all articles by Henock Louis

Henock Louis

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business

Dahlia Robinson

University of South Florida

Amy X. Sun

University of Houston

Date Written: March 5, 2019

Abstract

The revelation of the existence of limiting liability agreement (LLA) clauses in audit engagement letters of publicly traded companies results in substantial losses in firm value and lower shareholders’ approval of auditors. Consistent with investors’ reaction to the revelation being associated with concerns about audit quality, the loss in value is strongly related to clients’ incentives and opportunity to misreport. Specifically, the loss is more pronounced when a firm’s earnings quality is low, the firm’s recent reported earnings barely meet the average analyst earnings forecast, the firm has recently issued stocks, and the managers have recently sold stocks on their own accounts. The loss is attenuated when outsiders constitute a super-majority of the firm’s board of directors. Overall, the evidence suggests that investors attribute a substantial premium to external audits and that investors’ negative perception of audit quality significantly increases issuers’ cost of capital and, consequently, adversely affects firm value.

Keywords: Value of external audits; Liability limiting agreement; Auditor approval

JEL Classification: M42, K22, K41

Suggested Citation

Louis, Henock and Robinson, Dahlia and Sun, Amy X., Perceived Audit Quality and Firm Value: Evidence From Investors’ Reaction to the Revelation of Limiting Liability Agreements in Audit Engagement Letters (March 5, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347397 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3347397

Henock Louis (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-865-4160 (Phone)
814-863-8393 (Fax)

Dahlia Robinson

University of South Florida ( email )

4202 E. Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403
Tampa, FL 33620-5500
United States
8139746888 (Phone)

Amy X. Sun

University of Houston ( email )

Bauer College of Business
334 Melcher Hall, 390H
Houston, TX 77204
United States
7137435682 (Phone)

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