Competition and Fatigue

61 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2019 Last revised: 9 Jun 2021

See all articles by Vera Angelova

Vera Angelova

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Thomas Giebe

Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Date Written: May 28, 2021

Abstract

We study how subjects deal with fatigue in a sequence of tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers. Our contribution is threefold. First, we develop a model that allows us to predict the consequences of varying the severity of competition as well as the ease of recovery over time. Second, we test how fatigue spillovers affect subjects' effort provision. Third, as we employ both, a chosen-effort and a real-effort task, we contribute to the methodological question of the consistency of insights obtained from both paradigms. Our experimental results suggest that subjects have difficulties in dealing with fatigue within a dynamic competitive environment. The model predicts strategic resting before and after a tournament with higher incentives. While an increase in incentives in one tournament does lead to higher effort in that tournament, we do not observe the expected strategic resting before and after that tournament. As a consequence, the increase in incentives does not yield the expected higher total effort.

Keywords: incentives; fatigue; recovery; tournament; theory; experiment;

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D91, J22, J33, J81, L2, M52

Suggested Citation

Angelova, Vera and Giebe, Thomas and Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, Competition and Fatigue (May 28, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3348516

Vera Angelova (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Straße des 17
Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

Thomas Giebe

Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Växjö, 351 06
Sweden

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin) ( email )

Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany

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