Public Finance, Public Goods Provision, and Government Responsiveness: Evidence from Rural China

47 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2019

See all articles by Zhenhuan Lei

Zhenhuan Lei

University of Wisconsin - Madison - La Follette School of Public Affairs; University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science

Date Written: March 8, 2019

Abstract

Governmental fiscal transfers can be important tools for redistributing resources and enhancing public services in areas with limited local resources. At the same time, politicians can use fiscal transfers to build patronage networks, weaken opposition candidates, or engage in rent-seeking. An understudied feature of governmental transfers is that local governments can become fiscally dependent on higher-level government. This dependence might lead local officials to favor the priorities of higher-level government while compromising responsiveness to local residents. Using panel data from Chinese villages and a two-way fixed effects design, I demonstrate that when villages become more dependent on fiscal transfers from townships, they provide fewer public goods to villagers and more private goods to village elites. The results also suggest that fiscal transfers will not undermine local representation when electoral competition for village leadership positions exists or consent of the villagers is required for the use of funding.

Keywords: China, Public Finance, Fiscal Transfers, Public Goods, Government Responsiveness

Suggested Citation

Lei, Zhenhuan, Public Finance, Public Goods Provision, and Government Responsiveness: Evidence from Rural China (March 8, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348778 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3348778

Zhenhuan Lei (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison - La Follette School of Public Affairs ( email )

1225 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53705
United States

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science ( email )

Madison, WI
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
53
Abstract Views
469
rank
415,896
PlumX Metrics