Single‐Party Rule, Public Spending, and Political Rents: Evidence from Finnish Municipalities

27 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2019

See all articles by Jaakko Meriläinen

Jaakko Meriläinen

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica

Date Written: April 2019

Abstract

In this paper, I investigate the differences in public spending and extraction of political rents between single‐party and coalition governments. Common pool theories predict that coalitions tend to spend more and extract more rents than single‐party governments. Using data from Finnish municipalities for the years 1997–2012 and a regression discontinuity design approach tailored for proportional elections, I provide causal evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Common‐pool problem, government composition, local government, regression discontinuity design

Suggested Citation

Meriläinen, Jaakko, Single‐Party Rule, Public Spending, and Political Rents: Evidence from Finnish Municipalities (April 2019). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, Issue 2, pp. 736-762, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349368 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12288

Jaakko Meriläinen (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica ( email )

Av. Camino a Santa Teresa #930
Col. Heroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 10370
Mexico

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/jaakkomerilainen/

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