Conflicting Perspectives in Trade and Environmental Negotiations

29 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2002

See all articles by Roberto Roson

Roberto Roson

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia; Bocconi University - IEFE Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy; Loyola Andalucia University

Barbara K. Buchner

International Energy Agency; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Date Written: September 2002

Abstract

International trade negotiations have recently tackled the issue of possible free trade restrictions, justified - among others - on the basis of environmental concerns. Also, some analyses of international environmental agreements (especially in the field of climate change) have highlighted the key role played by changes in the terms of trade in determining the cost of environmental policies. Yet, secondary effects of international trade remain disregarded in many environmental policies, whereas the introduction of environmental trade barriers has been resisted, arguing that this may hide a Trojan horse of a renewed protectionism.

This paper reviews the debate on trade and the environment in the two fields of environmental and trade negotiations, highlighting the different and somewhat conflicting approach adopted in the two cases. A numerical general equilibrium model is used to illustrate how different "perceptions" (translated in terms of alternative model closures) affect the use of instruments, the distributional impact of the various policies, and the strategic interplay between negotiators in international agreements.

Keywords: Trade Policy, Environmental Policy, Climate Change, General Equilibrium Models

JEL Classification: F18, C68

Suggested Citation

Roson, Roberto and Buchner, Barbara K., Conflicting Perspectives in Trade and Environmental Negotiations (September 2002). FEEM Working Paper No. 68.2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=334981 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.334981

Roberto Roson (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

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Venice, 30121
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HOME PAGE: http://venus.unive.it/roson

Bocconi University - IEFE Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy ( email )

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Loyola Andalucia University ( email )

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Barbara K. Buchner

International Energy Agency ( email )

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France
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+33(0)140576739 (Fax)

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )

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Venezia, 30122
Italy
+39 04 1271 1470 (Phone)
+39 04 1271 1461 (Fax)

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