Horizontal Shareholding within the European Competition Law Framework: Assessment and a Way Forward
European Competition Law Review 40(4), 157-165, 2019
9 Pages Posted: 8 May 2019
Date Written: February 28, 2019
Horizontal shareholding engenders significant anticompetitive effects which current economic trends are exacerbating. Literature and institutions in Europe have yet to establish whether a suitable instrument within European competition law exists which may be applied to horizontal shareholding in order to curtail its intrinsic anticompetitive effects. This Article evaluates the state of the debate, analyses European competition law instruments, and shows that no adequate instrument is available. Ultimately, it proposes a novel approach to the notion of collective dominance suitable to support enforcement against horizontal shareholding on the basis of Article 102 TFEU.
This material was first published by Thomson Reuters, trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 5 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AQ, in European Competition Law Review and is reproduced by agreement with the publishers.
Keywords: Antitrust, horizontal shareholding, common ownership, common shareholding, institutional investors, passive investment
JEL Classification: D21, D43, G23, G32, K21, K22, L10, L13, L21, L22, L40, L41
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