Investment Arbitration and Political Systems Theory

in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration, OUP 2019

Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1484

King's College London Law School Research Paper Forthcoming

25 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2019 Last revised: 10 Jan 2020

See all articles by Cedric G. Dupont

Cedric G. Dupont

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID)

Thomas Schultz

King's College London; University of Geneva

Jason W. Yackee

University of Wisconsin Law School

Date Written: March 12, 2019

Abstract

This chapter suggests that political systems theory allows us to make better sense of the fragmented understanding we have today of investment law in general and of investment arbitration in particular. Relying on a theory by David Easton, the chapter presents investment arbitration as a political system: one that transforms the input of key actors into output, with feedback loops from the latter to the former. This perspective, the chapter contends, helps us get a better sense of some of the system’s key dynamics, including its conditions of stability, factors and direction of change, and the functions it is effectively called upon to fulfill. It grounds the discussion of the drivers of investment arbitration more closely in reality than do the common references to notions of obsolescing bargain, credible commitment, promotion of the rule of law, and development of sensible rules of state behaviour.

Keywords: investment arbitration, systems theory, regimes dynamics

JEL Classification: K41

Suggested Citation

Dupont, Cedric G. and Schultz, Thomas and Yackee, Jason W., Investment Arbitration and Political Systems Theory (March 12, 2019). in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration, OUP 2019; Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1484; King's College London Law School Research Paper Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3351343

Cedric G. Dupont

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) ( email )

Thomas Schultz (Contact Author)

King's College London ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Jason W. Yackee

University of Wisconsin Law School ( email )

975 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States

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