Amicable Settlements in Investor-State Disputes: Empirical Analysis of Patterns and Perceived Problems

Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 21, 2020, pp. 528-557

Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 19/17

31 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2019 Last revised: 30 Jun 2020

See all articles by Ana Ubilava

Ana Ubilava

The University of Sydney, Law School

Date Written: March 13, 2019

Abstract

This article empirically analyses investor-state arbitration cases that settle amicably after the arbitration has commenced but before the final award is rendered. The study investigates whether and to what extent some common criticisms of amicable settlements are evident in practice. It examines four research questions that correspond with the major critiques of amicable settlements in investor-state dispute settlement:

(1) Is the amicable dispute settlement mechanism unsuitable for certain types of investor-state disputes?

(2) Do amicable settlements impede transparency?

(3) Does amicable settlement pay less compared to when the investor wins through an award?

(4) Is the non-enforceability of settlement agreements a problem in practice?

The findings suggest that not all these purported problematic aspects of amicable dispute settlement mechanisms are as evident in practice as is commonly believed.

Keywords: amicable settlements, investor-state arbitration, investor-state dispute settlement, investor-state mediation

JEL Classification: K10, K30

Suggested Citation

Ubilava, Ana, Amicable Settlements in Investor-State Disputes: Empirical Analysis of Patterns and Perceived Problems (March 13, 2019). Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 21, 2020, pp. 528-557, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 19/17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3352181 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3352181

Ana Ubilava (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney, Law School ( email )

Faculty of Law Building, F10
Sydney, NSW
Australia

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