Who Directs Direct Democracy

University of Chicago Roundtable, Vol. 4, Special Edition, 1997

Posted: 7 Oct 1997

Abstract

In this paper, I dispute one of the central claims of supporters of direct democracy -- that such lawmaking is freer from special interest domination than lawmaking by legislatures. I also challenge supporters' claim that the availability of the initiative and referendum provides a desirable safeguard to empower ordinary citizens. In fact, special interests, not ordinary citizens, generally frame the terms of debate concerning ballot measures. Traditional lawmaking and direct lawmaking are different mechanisms used to aggregate and shape individual preferences, which may lead to different outcomes, but both are influenced disproportionately by those groups that can express their preferences more loudly or clearly than other groups or individuals. Second, judges also play a role in determining the direction of direct democracy. Very little scholarly attention has been directed to the appropriate method of interpreting laws passed by direct democracy. I offer some preliminary thoughts on this provocative question and on the role courts might play in ameliorating the deliberative shortcomings of direct democracy and in reducing the distorting influence of interest groups in the process.

JEL Classification: D72, K19

Suggested Citation

Garrett, Elizabeth, Who Directs Direct Democracy. University of Chicago Roundtable, Vol. 4, Special Edition, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=33522

Elizabeth Garrett (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-0064 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

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