Pecking Order Theory for Government Finance

30 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2019

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

In this article we argue that asymmetric information can explain why seignorage is an inferior choice to debt for governments. We also argue that the Ricardian equivalence for governments is very similar to what the Modigliani-Miller proposition is for corporations. Our model is based on Bolton and Huang (2018) in that money for governments is similar to what equity is for corporations. In contrast to their model, our model considers rational economic agents.

Keywords: government finance, pecking order, capital structure, money, Ricardian Equivalence, Modigliani-Miller Proposition, asymmetric information

JEL Classification: D25, D82, D86, E40, E51, E52, E63, G32

Suggested Citation

Miglo, Anton, Pecking Order Theory for Government Finance (2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354044 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3354044

Anton Miglo (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://research-portal.uea.ac.uk/en/persons/anton-miglo

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