A Field Too Crowded? How Measures of Market Structure Shape Nonprofit Fiscal Health

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(3): 453-473. DOI: 10.1177/0899764018760398

36 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2019 Last revised: 25 May 2019

See all articles by Laurie Paarlberg

Laurie Paarlberg

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)

Seung-Ho An

Texas Tech University - Department of Political Science

Rebecca Nesbit

University of Georgia

Robert Christensen

Brigham Young University - J. Willard and Alice S. Marriott School of Management

Justin Bullock

Texas A&M University

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

This paper explores how various dimensions of market structure, often used to measure organizational crowding, affect the fiscal health of nonprofit organizations. Using 2011 NCCS nonprofit sector data, our findings generally support population ecology’s model of a curvilinear relationship between density and days of spending. However, we also find that single dimensions of market structure do not fully capture the effects of market competition. While increasing density has a negative effect on the fiscal health of organizations in markets in which resources are more evenly distributed among actors, in markets in which resources are less evenly distributed among actors, increasing density of organizations has a positive effect on organizational fiscal health. These results are sensitive to different specifications of fiscal health and field of nonprofit activity.

Keywords: carrying capacity, population ecology, market structure, fiscal health, empirical

Suggested Citation

Paarlberg, Laurie and An, Seung-Ho and Nesbit, Rebecca and Christensen, Robert and Bullock, Justin, A Field Too Crowded? How Measures of Market Structure Shape Nonprofit Fiscal Health (2018). Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(3): 453-473. DOI: 10.1177/0899764018760398. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354108 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3354108

Laurie Paarlberg (Contact Author)

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) ( email )

1309 E. 10th St.
Indianapolis, IN 47405
United States

Seung-Ho An

Texas Tech University - Department of Political Science ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.seunghoan.com

Rebecca Nesbit

University of Georgia ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Robert Christensen

Brigham Young University - J. Willard and Alice S. Marriott School of Management ( email )

Provo, UT 84602
United States

Justin Bullock

Texas A&M University ( email )

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