Trading Costs and Informational Efficiency

69 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2019 Last revised: 13 Feb 2021

See all articles by Eduardo Davila

Eduardo Davila

Yale University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cecilia Parlatore

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: March 2019

Abstract

We study the effect of trading costs on information aggregation and acquisition in financial markets. For a given precision of investors' private information, an irrelevance result emerges when investors are ex-ante identical: price informativeness is independent of the level of trading costs. When investors are ex-ante heterogeneous, anything goes, and a change in trading costs can increase or decrease price informativeness, depending on the source of heterogeneity. Our results are valid under quadratic, linear, and fixed costs. Through a reduction in information acquisition, trading costs reduce price informativeness. We discuss how our results inform the policy debate on financial transaction taxes/Tobin taxes.

Suggested Citation

Davila, Eduardo and Parlatore, Cecilia, Trading Costs and Informational Efficiency (March 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25662, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354316

Eduardo Davila (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cecilia Parlatore

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ceciliaparlatore.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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