A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-07

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2020

9 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2019 Last revised: 6 Feb 2020

See all articles by Tim Friehe

Tim Friehe

University of Marburg

Murat C. Mungan

Texas A&M University School of Law

Date Written: March 18, 2019

Abstract

This article shows that moderate regulatory sanctions can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that moderate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and dynamic efficiency.

Keywords: Regulation, Sanctions, Compliance, Technology

JEL Classification: K42, L51

Suggested Citation

Friehe, Tim and Mungan, Murat C., A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions (March 18, 2019). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-07, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3354938

Tim Friehe

University of Marburg ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 24
D-35032 Marburg, D-35032
Germany

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University School of Law

1515 Commerce St.
Fort Worth, TX Tarrant County 76102
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
Abstract Views
846
Rank
646,120
PlumX Metrics