Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Moderate Regulatory Sanctions

7 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2019 Last revised: 7 May 2019

See all articles by Tim Friehe

Tim Friehe

University of Marburg

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: March 18, 2019

Abstract

This article shows that moderate regulatory sanctions can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that moderate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and dynamic efficiency.

Keywords: Regulation, Sanctions, Compliance, Technology

JEL Classification: K42, L51

Suggested Citation

Friehe, Tim and Mungan, Murat C., Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Moderate Regulatory Sanctions (March 18, 2019). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3354938

Tim Friehe

University of Marburg ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 24
D-35032 Marburg, D-35032
Germany

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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