The Corporate Governance Role of the Media

38 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2002

See all articles by I. J. Alexander Dyck

I. J. Alexander Dyck

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2002

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the role of the media in pressuring corporate managers and directors to behave in ways that are "socially acceptable". Sometimes this coincides with shareholders' value maximization, others not. We provide both anecdotal and systematic evidence that media affect companies' policy toward the environment and the amount of corporate resources that are diverted to the sole advantage of controlling shareholders. Our results have important consequences for the focus of the corporate governance debate and for the feasibility of reforms aimed at improving corporate governance around the world.

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Dyck, I.J. Alexander and Zingales, Luigi, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media (August 2002). CRSP Working Paper No. 543, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=335602 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.335602

I.J. Alexander Dyck

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

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Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Belgium

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