The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme

24 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2019

See all articles by Eva Van Belle

Eva Van Belle

Ghent University - Department of Social Economics

Ralf Caers

KU Leuven

Marijke De Couck

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

Valentina Di Stasio

University of Oxford

Stijn Baert

Ghent University; University of Antwerp; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2019

Abstract

We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor‐market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job‐vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.

Suggested Citation

Van Belle, Eva and Caers, Ralf and De Couck, Marijke and Di Stasio, Valentina and Baert, Stijn, The Signal of Applying for a Job Under a Vacancy Referral Scheme (April 2019). Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 251-274, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irel.12230

Eva Van Belle (Contact Author)

Ghent University - Department of Social Economics ( email )

Hoveniersberg 24
Gent, 9000
Belgium

Ralf Caers

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

Marijke De Couck

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) ( email )

Pleinlaan 2
http://www.vub.ac.be/
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

Valentina Di Stasio

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Stijn Baert

Ghent University ( email )

University of Antwerp ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, Antwerp 2000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uantwerpen.be/nl/personeel/stijn-baert/

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) ( email )

Place Montesquieu, 3
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uclouvain.be/en-309318.html

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_html?key=6832

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