NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER: "ODD" RECIDIVISM NUMBERS UNDERMINE THE GUANTANAMO POLICY DEBATE

Abstract

The government’s justification for claiming that released detainees were dangerous rests upon a small number of known recidivists and has ignored the vast number of released detainees whose post-release conduct corroborates the original DoD assessment that most Guantánamo detainees did not warrant detention. Creating and implementing effective detainee release policy will not be possible until a full and balanced account of detainees’ post-detention behavior is made public.

For understandable policy and national security reasons, Americans should care about the judgment and accuracy of the decisions made regarding detainee releases. To that end, an investigation into the post-release conduct of all detainees is crucial. A complete investigation would focus both on the detainees who have done well and those who have engaged in misconduct following their release. Absent that, a complete picture will never emerge.

Nonetheless, the government has never attempted to address both sides of this issue, instead only reporting on those who may have engaged in misconduct. Further, government reports generally refuse to identify the supposed recidivists, which makes informed debate about the about policy and practice of releasing detainees impossible.

Indeed, the government has now taken the first step towards clarifying the recidivism question. In a remarkable admission, Todd Breasseale, the Public Affairs Officer for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, has admitted that official statements were deeply problematic by virtue of “conflating” the percentage of “confirmed” and “suspected” recidivists to create what he calls an “odd 27-28% number” of total recidivists. It is “odd” precisely because “[s]omeone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very possibly NOT be engaged in activities that are counter to our national security interests.” In short, this is a striking admission that the percentage of recidivists repeatedly tossed around, most recently by the House Armed Services Committee, is a substantially inflated statement of potential threats to national security. If the Defense Department or Congress focused on the only number that seems to be meaningful, the number of confirmed recidivists, the correct percentage is reduced to 15.9%.

In the absence of better government clarification of its recidivism numbers, the report that follows seeks to provide a more complete picture of post-release GTMO detainees. The findings are quite simple:

1) The government knew very early on that there were mostly low-value detainees in Guantánamo. Then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld admitted as much in 2003 in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which complained that Guantánamo was “populated with low-level enemy combatants.”

2) The government’s own actions make clear that it knew the vast majority of detainees were not dangerous because:
• For many years it released them without regard to anything but diplomatic considerations.
• The government admitted that it did not keep track of released detainees until at least 2007.
• The government admitted that its primary source of information was reporting by the press, not government intelligence.

3) Government reports pointedly ignore the plentiful information regarding the transitions by most detainees to peaceful civilian life.
• The same pool of information used by the government to create the lists of alleged recidivists reveals hundreds of released detainees who have returned to peaceful, private lives.
• The press has reported that released detainees have gone to college and law school, entered politics, and written books. They even served as translators for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and stopped terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland.
• None of these stories have been mentioned by the government. Instead, the government merely indentifies 31 individuals as recidivists and gives details from only a handful of the worst cases.

4) The government’s various lists of recidivists appear to be an attempt to justify post hoc the Guantánamo detentions for the following reasons:
• Few new named recidivists have been alleged in recent years.
• Even the 31 specifically named recidivists is inflated:
• DoD admits that of its 31 named recidivists at least 14 are merely suspected.
• The DoD admits that suspected recidivists may in fact not be recidivists and should not be conflated with those who are confirmed.
• DoD admits that it can confirm only 15 as actual recidivists.
• Many of these allegations are weak or unsubstantiated.
• DoD admits that its definition of recidivism has included engaging in propaganda and “other activities.”
• DoD admits that its definition of recidivism does not require any hostile acts toward the U.S. or U.S. interests.
• DoD admits that its definition of recidivism applies to released detainees returned to their home country attacking their own citizens.
• For example, 5 of the 31 named recidivists were Russians who allegedly attacked other Russians in Russia.
• DoD admits that its definition of recidivism includes released detainees who not only never attacked the U.S. or U.S. interests, but never left their home country.

5) Acts that constituted reengagement according to the government consisted of conduct that most Americans might not object to and sometimes were things that American’s hold quite dear, such as the freedom of speech.

Beyond these findings, this report has three main takeaways. First, we show that the entire series of government statements about released detainees is one-sided, omitting the stories of detainees who have been released and have done something positive with their lives since their time at Guantanamo. Second, we explain how the government’s statements are internally inconsistent and have created a pattern of errors. Finally, we show that the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the House Armed Services Committee have all knowingly portrayed detainee post-release behavior in an inaccurate manner.

Keywords: Recividism, National Security, Guantanamo, High-Value Detainees, Department of Defense, Post-Release Behavior, U.S. Government, Policy Debate, Attorney-Client Relationship, Videotaping, Interrogations, Detentions, Detainee Transition, Prosecution